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Complementarity of 
Shared Compensation and 
Decision- Making  Systems
Evidence from the 
American Labor Market
Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
In the 1990s an increasing proportion of US ﬁ  rms moved toward compensa-
tion systems that made part of pay depend on the economic performance of 
work groups or the ﬁ  rm. They gave proﬁ  t- sharing bonuses, paid group incen-
tive schemes (gain sharing), developed employee stock ownership programs 
(ESOPs), awarded stock options, and funded pensions through deﬁ  ned con-
tribution pension plans that put considerable assets in the stock of the ﬁ  rm. 
Over the same period, ﬁ  rms introduced teams, total quality management, 
quality circles, employee involvement committees, and other structures that 
gave employees a greater role in decision making.
How signiﬁ  cant are these new forms of compensation and modes of 
employee involvement? To what extent are the new forms of compensation 
linked to employee involvement programs? How have they aﬀected employee 
behavior and attitude?
This chapter examines these questions using the nationally representa-
tive 1994–  1995 Freeman-  Rogers Workplace Representation and Participa-
tion Survey (WRPS) for the United States (Freeman and Rogers 1999), 
and the 2003 California Establishment Survey (CES). The WRPS focuses 
on employee involvement and work organization but also asks about the 
mode of compensation so that we can link compensation systems and em-
ployee decision making. The CES surveys businesses on compensation and 
decision-  making practices, and has productivity-  related outcomes that 
allows us to examine the relation between ﬁ  rm performance and compen-
sation and decision-  making systems. These data provide an independent 
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check on the results from the analysis of the General Social Survey and the 
NBER Shared Capitalism surveys used in previous chapters.
We ﬁ nd that: (a) new forms of compensation based on pay for group 
or company performance, or ownership of company shares have increased 
rapidly; (b) compensation systems that base part of pay on company or 
group performance are linked with employee participation in decision mak-
ing, suggesting that these institutions form a complementary package of 
employee-  management relations; (c) together, employee involvement pro-
grams and shared compensation improve outcomes such as job satisfaction, 
attitude toward the ﬁ  rm, and the likelihood of staying with the ﬁ  rm. In the 
worker survey, involvement programs have an independent eﬀect on out-
comes whereas the eﬀect of shared compensation depends on the presence 
of involvement programs. (d) The highest outcomes occur when ﬁ  rms com-
bine pay for company or group performance with an ownership stake in the 
ﬁ  rm and employee involvement committees. This supports the notion that 
these policies form a complementary package of employee-  management 
relations.
The principal weakness in our study is the lack of exogenous variation 
in the presence of compensation and decision-  making systems, which ﬁ  rms 
choose, presumably for economic reasons. Still, the evidence ﬁ  ts more read-
ily with the hypothesis that shared compensation and decision- making have 
real economic impact through altering collective employee incentives than 
with the null hypothesis that the results reﬂ  ect sorting of ﬁ  rms or the impact 
of a single unobservable variable. We ﬁ  nd similar associations in the two 
data sets and in speciﬁ  cations that control for unobserved factors. We also 
ﬁ  nd complementarity in both the incidence of shared compensation and 
decision making and in their relation to outcomes that suggests that the 
systems have real eﬀects even though unobservable factors may bias esti-
mated magnitudes.
5.1      The New Forms of Pay
Traditional economic analysis of labor contracts distinguish between: 
employment contracts, whereby a ﬁ  rm buys the time of a worker to do what 
management views as proﬁ  table and pays a time- based wage; and sales con-
tracts, where the ﬁ  rms buys a product from the worker (Simon 1957). In the 
employment contract model, the employer determines the activities that 
workers undertake at the workplace subject to principal/  agent problems 
when the employer cannot fully monitor employee eﬀort. By contrast, the 
sales contract is a model of self-  employment where the worker decides how 
much to work and how to produce the product. The classic sales contract 
in the job market is the piece rate. In cases where pieces can be readily mea-
sured, this solves principal agent problems but loses the advantages of coor-
dinating work and of workers sharing knowledge of newly discovered ways 
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The shared compensation and decision- making arrangements on which we 
focus ﬁ  t between these polar cases. Under these arrangements workers share 
the ﬁ  nancial beneﬁ  ts and risks of economic activity and/  or decisions about 
production with the ﬁ  rm. Ideally, giving workers a ﬁ  nancial incentive to 
behave in the interests of the ﬁ  rm and empowering them to make decisions 
increases the value of the ﬁ  rm and enhances worker well-  being.
There are diverse systems of shared compensation. We diﬀerentiate be-
tween systems that involve ﬁ  nancial ownership, where the workers’ reward 
depends on share prices, and group or company proﬁ  t-  sharing or bonus sys-
tems that reward workers on the basis of group or company performance 
irrespective of share prices. Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 
majority employee ownership, deﬁ  ned contribution retirement plan money 
invested in one’s own ﬁ  rm, stock purchase plans, and employee stock options 
all ﬁ  t under the ﬁ  nancial ownership rubric. Gain sharing, proﬁ  t sharing, 
bonuses linked to performance, Scanlon plans based on cost-  saving, and so 
on, ﬁ  t under the proﬁ  t-  sharing rubric.
There are also diverse institutions for shared decision making. Employee 
involvement committees (EI), works councils as in the European Union, 
quality circles, and team production give workers a say in what happens at 
their work site. At the corporate level, workers can serve on boards, which 
Germany legislatively requires but which is uncommon in the United States, 
and worker-  run pension funds can appoint directors.
Our classiﬁ  cation arguably exaggerates diﬀerences among systems. Almost 
all employment arrangements have scope for sharing proﬁ  ts and decisions 
between owners and workers. Most workers paid straight time wages have 
some control over decisions, and the better they perform, the more likely 
the ﬁ  rm will give them pay increases, promotions, and other beneﬁ  ts in the 
future. At the other end, even small partnerships will divide decision making 
unevenly, while piece rate systems are more complicated than the simple sales 
contract model indicates, especially when the ﬁ  rm has to update the piece 
rates regularly due to technological change (Freeman and Kleiner 1999). 
Still, the diﬀerences between traditional employment and sales contracts 
and modern shared compensation contracts are suﬃciently large to make 
this a useful typology.
The incentive to free ride can create a problem for shared compensation 
structures. Rationalizing employee stock ownership or company- wide proﬁ  t 
sharing is diﬃcult because it is hard to see how these systems can motivate 
individual workers. Some observers think that it is one thing to pay the CEO 
of Starbucks or Bank of America stock options or proﬁ  t-  related bonuses, 
since their decisions can aﬀect the share price and proﬁ  ts; but the clerks at a 
local store can hardly aﬀect the share price or company- wide proﬁ  ts. Lazear 
(1999) oﬀers a sorting explanation for variable pay among managers—
that compensation linked to long-  term ﬁ  nancial viability of the company 
elicits better information from managers about the true state of aﬀairs. But, 
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lower level workers. Oyer (2004) argues that options may attract workers 
optimistic about the ﬁ  rm—which in conjunction with tax beneﬁ  ts from de-
layed exercise of options can provide an edge to this form of compensation. 
However, this seems to imply that options are useful mainly when they can 
fool employees, which is unlikely over a long period of time.
One possible explanation is that variable compensation aﬀects employees 
by helping create a corporate culture that improves company performance. 
For instance, if employees share the gains when the company is doing well, 
they may feel more enthusiastic about putting forth greater eﬀort based 
on notions of fairness, even if rational calculations favor free riding on the 
eﬀorts of others. They may self-  monitor eﬀort at the workplace, along the 
lines shown by Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi (chapter 2)
In any case, if shared compensation schemes aﬀect employees’ willing-
ness to engage in production issues, it makes sense to couple such schemes 
with programs that devolve workplace decisions to workers. Firms that give 
workers ﬁ  nancial incentives but that do not empower them to make decisions 
are unlikely to beneﬁ  t from the incentive system. Firms that give workers 
decision-  making authority but no ﬁ  nancial incentive risk workers making 
decisions that are not in the ﬁ  rms’ interest. Thus, we expect ﬁ  nancial sharing 
systems to be complementary with systems of shared decision making, and 
for shared compensation and decision making to produce higher outcomes 
together than they do separately.
5.2      Extent of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems
How extensive are shared compensation and decision-  making systems? 
How has their prevalence changed over time? These basic questions are 
diﬃcult to answer because until the General Social Survey (GSS) asked 
about the systems in 2002 and 2006 there was no single nationally representa-
tive source of data on the extent of shared capitalism. Most administrative-
  based or establishment-  based compensation surveys cover a single form of 
pay—such as deﬁ  ned contribution pension funds, 401(k) plans, or proﬁ  t-
  sharing—without information on the overlap with other forms of ﬁ  nancial 
sharing. Since workers receive several forms of pay related to performance, 
simply adding the numbers under each separate category will overstate the 
total number of workers having shared compensation pay systems. The 
employment cost index includes bonuses and proﬁ  t sharing but excludes 
stock options and related programs and provides no information on pension 
funds invested in the ﬁ  rm. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) conducted 
a national beneﬁ  t survey in 2000, but this focused primarily on retirement 
and health beneﬁ  t plans. The BLS’s 1999 survey of the incidence of stock 
option-  based compensation did not ask about other types of shared com-
pensation plans.
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measurement error, particularly of the size and nature of beneﬁ  t programs. 
In their study of pensions held by older workers, Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1999) report that “discrepancies between ﬁ  rm provided and administrative 
records . . . and respondent reports . . . are large for many respondents.” 
Opinion surveys ﬁ  nd that 10 or so percent of workers report that their ﬁ  rm 
is employee-  owned, which far exceeds any plausible estimate from admin-
istrative records (Freeman and Rogers 1999). Many workers may interpret 
having a 401(k) plan that invests in their ﬁ  rm, or individual ownership of 
shares, as employee ownership when in fact the ﬁ  rm is principally owned by 
shareholders rather than workers. Still, by piecing together data from several 
sources, and comparing the results with the GSS, we can get a general picture 
of the extent and growth of new forms of compensation.
Table 5.1 estimates the proportion of the private sector workforce that 
had a ﬁ  nancial stake in the performance of their ﬁ  rm in the late 1990s from 
the sources described in appendix table 5A.1. This alternative approach 
provides a good check on the recent data from the General Social Survey. 
Approximately 25 percent of the workforce had a stake in their ﬁ  rm through 
some form of ownership. The main vehicle for employee ownership has 
been the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). The National Center of 
Employee Ownership (NCEO) estimated that in 1998 some 8,500,000 work-
ers were employed in over 11,400 ESOP and related stock bonus plans with 
combined assets of around 400 billion.1 This is about 8 percent of the US 
private sector workforce. In addition, the NCEO estimates that 7 to 10 mil-
Table 5.1  Percentage of employees/ﬁ  rms with pay related to company/group 
performance
Stock ownership programs 25% of nonagricultural workforce
Proﬁ  t or gain sharing 25% of US workforce
Deﬁ  ned contribution pension funds invested heavily in 
 company  stock
11% of US workforce
Total with any form of shared compensation adjusted 
 for  overlap
45% of US workforce
Source: For details, see appendix table 5A.1.
Note: If workers were covered by only one form of variable pay, our estimate would be the sum 
of the estimates for the bold categories in the table: 61 percent, of which 50 percentage points 
consists of ownership and incentive pay. But there is considerable overlap in coverage. On the 
basis of the WRPS ﬁ  gures in table 5.2, we estimate that the proportion of workers with any 
form of performance pay and ownership exceeds the sum of the proportions covered by each 
form separately by 33 percent  (41.9  29.6)/53.8. Thus, we reduce the 50 percent to 38 per-
cent. We do not have data on the overlap with the estimated 11 percent of workers with 401(k) 
or other plans with sizable amounts of company shares, but anticipate that this will be modest, 
giving us the 45 percent in the text.
1. More recent ﬁ  gures from NCEO indicate that in 2002, some 8.8 million workers were 
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lion workers receive stock options as part of all employee stock option plans, 
for another 8 percent or so of the private sector workforce. This estimate 
contrasts with the employee survey conducted by the BLS, which found that 
in 1999, 1.7 percent of all employees, or 5.3 percent of employees of publicly-
 traded companies received options grants in 1999. Some of the divergence is 
likely due to diﬀerences in the timing covered by questions. Since companies 
may not give out broad-  based options each year, the number of employees 
who “regularly” receive options is greater than those who might receive it in 
one particular year. An additional 10 percent or so of the workforce received 
special opportunities to buy company stock.
Proﬁ  t sharing diﬀers from employee ownership because it depends on 
accounting proﬁ  ts rather than share values. Employees at Amazon.com 
would receive nothing in proﬁ  t shares when the ﬁ  rm has not turned a proﬁ  t 
but would have gained from ownership of options, as the share price of the 
company increased rapidly. Most proﬁ  t sharing is deferred, with the proﬁ  t 
share put into an employee retirement account (Proﬁ  t Sharing Council of 
America [PSCA] 1993; BLS 1999). Gain- sharing plans typically tie employee 
compensation to a group- based operational measure—such as physical out-
put, productivity, quality, safety, customer satisfaction, or costs—rather 
than to a ﬁ  nancial measure such as proﬁ  tability. We estimate that about 25 
percent of American workers are paid in part with some form of group or 
company ﬁ  nancial incentives.
The third major way in which ﬁ  rms pay workers based on ﬁ  rm perfor-
mance is through non-  ESOP deﬁ  ned contribution pension plans, such as 
401(k) plans. In 1997 55 percent of full-  time employees had 401(k) plans 
(approximately the same proportion had any form of deﬁ  ned contribution 
pension). While we lack estimates on the proportion of workers with 401(k) 
or other deﬁ  ned contribution funds invested in their ﬁ  rm, estimates of the 
proportion of 401(k) assets in company stock hover around 20 percent. 
Absent better information, on the basis of these ﬁ  gures we estimate that 
roughly 11 percent ( .55  20) of workers have their retirement pay depend 
on company shares to some extent.
Because workers who receive one form of shared compensation may also 
receive another form, we cannot add these separate estimates together to 
obtain the proportion of the workforce whose compensation depends on 
company performance. We must subtract the proportion with an overlap 
in coverage. Making such an adjustment, we estimate that about 45 percent 
of workers have a substantial portion of their pay varying with company 
or group performance. This proportion is almost identical to estimates of 
shared compensation programs from the 2002 and 2006 General Social 
 Survey.2
Figure 5.1 shows that the forms of variable pay have increased rapidly. The 
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proportion of private sector employees with ESOPs rose from 0 percent in 
1975 to 4 percent in 1980 to 8 percent in 1990, but then stabilized in the 1990s. 
By contrast, the proportion receiving stock options rose greatly in the 1990s. 
A William Mercer company study found that the proportion of ﬁ  rms grant-
ing options more than doubled between 1993 and 1998. Figures for large 
electronics ﬁ  rms show a fourfold increase between 1994 and 1997. In 1999 39 
percent of the Inc. magazine 500 fastest- growing privately- held ﬁ  rms oﬀered 
options to workers; in 1998, the ﬁ  gure was 26 percent.3 A Federal Reserve 
Board Survey of 125 large ﬁ  rms found that 23 percent had introduced stock 
option programs for regular employees between 1996 and 1998, while 37 per-
cent had broadened the eligibility of their existing program.4 Proﬁ  t-  sharing 
plans or gain- sharing plans increased over the period among large ﬁ  rms. The 
45 percent of Fortune 1000 ﬁ  rms that reported proﬁ   t- gain- sharing  systems 
in 1995 was up from 26 percent in 1987. Finally, ﬁ  xed contribution pension 
plans grew in the 1990s as well. Assuming that investment in company stock 
Fig. 5.1    The growth of shared compensation systems
Source: ESOP Employees from NCEO Employee Ownership Report, Jan– Feb.’00, p. 9; Broad 
Based Stock Options: from Mercer & Co. Executive Compensation Research Topics RT#10—
May 26, 1998, p. 5; Fortune 1000 ﬁ  rms with gain-  /  proﬁ  t-  sharing from employment policy 
foundation, “US Wage and Productivity Growth,” 1998; Workers with 401(K) plans from US 
Statistical Abstract, 1999, table 622.
3. See NCEO (2000, 10).
4. Lebow et al. (1999), table 3.174    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
fell less rapidly or did not fall at all, more workers had part of their retire-
ment income tied to company performance.
In short, although measures of variable compensation are incomplete, 
there is no gainsaying that shared compensation mechanisms linking rewards 
to ﬁ  rm or group economic performance rose in the 1990s and to some extent 
in the 1980s as well.
5.3      Shared Compensation System and Employee Involvement
Over roughly the same time period that compensation practices were 
changing, employee involvement committees, teamwork, and other forms 
of empowering workers became the cutting edge of labor relations in the 
United States. Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroﬀ’s (2000) analysis of ﬁ  rms found 
a large increase in the number using various forms of employee involvement 
activity between 1983 and 1993. Osterman’s 1994 survey of establishments 
found that 55 percent used work teams, 34 percent had Total Quality Man-
agement (TQM), and 41 percent had quality circles (QC), with most intro-
duced in the late 1980s/ early 1990s. One- third of the workers in the 1995 and 
1996 WRPS reported that they served on employee involvement committees, 
deﬁ  ned broadly to include TQM, QC, and related groups; and 55 percent 
reported that their ﬁ  rm had such committees (Freeman and Rogers 1999).
Does the data support the prediction that ﬁ  nancial sharing and employee 
involvement are complementary ways of organizing work? For this we use 
the WRPS, which was a nationally representative survey of 2,408 adults 
age eighteen or older who were currently employed in private companies or 
nonproﬁ  t organizations in the continental United States with twenty- ﬁ  ve or 
more employees. A total of 2,408 employees responded to the ﬁ  rst wave in 
September and October 1994, and 801 respondents were reinterviewed in a 
second wave in December 1994 and January 1995 (see Freeman and Rogers 
[1999] for further detail).
Table 5.2 presents data from the WRPS on modes of compensation and 
shared decision making through employee involvement committees. With 
respect to compensation, we asked:
“On your main job do you . . . Participate in an employee stock owner-
ship or ESOP plan?; Work in an employee- owned company?; Receive any 
bonuses based on proﬁ  t sharing?; Receive any bonuses based on meeting 
workplace goals?”
Because the WRPS did not ask detailed questions about modes of ﬁ  nan-
cial sharing—for instance, distinguishing 401(k) plans or stock purchase 
plans—nor diﬀerentiate between gain-  sharing and individual bonuses, the 
data is not ideal. Still, aggregated into broad categories, it gives evidence on 
the coverage among workers of group incentive pay or ownership plans.
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workers according to their modes of compensation. It shows that 54 percent 
of the sample reported at least one of the variable forms of compensation, 
and that the incentive-  based systems of pay were more common than the 
ownership- based systems. The ﬁ  gures for ESOPs and ownership and incen-
tive bonuses are higher than those in table 5.1 (in part perhaps because the 
WRPS covers larger ﬁ  rms) with the result that the proportion of workers 
covered by at least one form of shared compensation exceeds the estimate 
in table 5.1.
The ﬁ  nal line in table 5.2 records the proportion of nonmanagerial em-
ployees who serve on employee involvement committees: 29.9 percent. Since 
the WRPS contained a full module on these committees, and asked workers 
details about how the committees operated and what they thought about 
them (see Freeman and Rogers [1999, chapter 4]), this is likely to be a reason-
ably accurate measure, at least for the sample covered.
The second column in table 5.2 gives the percentage of workers on EI 
committees who are paid with diﬀerent forms of variable pay, while the 
third column gives the percentage of workers not on EI committees paid 
by the same forms. Overall, 66 percent of workers on EI committees have 
some form of shared compensation, compared to 34 percent of workers 
who are not on those committees. A similar pattern is found for each of the 
individual forms of pay. The diﬀerence in the distribution of compensation 
between workers with EI and those without EI are statistically signiﬁ  cant in 
this comparison, and remains so in analyses that control for diverse covari-
ates. Thus, the WRPS conﬁ  rms the prediction that employee involvement 
programs will be closely tied to ﬁ  nancial sharing arrangements.
Figure 5.2 shows the complementarity among the forms of shared com-
pensation and employee involvement from a diﬀerent perspective. It con-
trasts the proportion of workers having various combinations of incentive 
pay, ﬁ  nancial sharing, and shared decision making with the proportion that 
we would expect if the probability of having the diﬀerent forms was an 
Table 5.2  Proportion of workers with shared compensation systems, full sample, 
and by presence of employee involvement (EI)
    Full sample (%)  With EI (%)  Without EI (%)
Any compensation structure 53.8 66.1 33.9
Performance pay 41.9 53 37
  Proﬁ  t Sharing 28.9 39.9 24.1
  Gain  sharing 26.2 32.8 23.3
Ownership 29.6 40.2 25
  ESOP 23 34.5 18
  Employee  owned 11.2 13.1 10.4
Employee involvement   29.9   100   0
Source: WRPS Survey, in What Workers Want. For exact wording of relevant WRPS ques-
tions, see appendix B, table 5A.2.176    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
independent draw from separate urns. Over twice as many workers report 
having all three forms than would occur if they were independent, and more 
workers have neither ﬁ  nancial nor incentive systems nor EI committees than 
would be expected. The concentration of frequency at the extremes is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that these forms of workplace organization and 
compensation are complementary.
Table 5.3 examines the characteristics of workers and ﬁ  rms with shared 
compensation systems and employee involvement activity. It reports the pro-
portion of workers with speciﬁ  ed demographic characteristics in the sample 
and in two polar cases: workers who have an ownership stake, proﬁ  t/  gain 
sharing, and shared decision making through EI committees; and workers 
with none of the systems. The pattern is clear. Workers at companies with 
shared decision-  making and compensation systems are better educated, 
more likely to be in the upper quartile of the wage distribution, more likely 
to be male, and more than twice as likely to be salaried than workers with 
none of the shared systems. In addition, the workers with all three forms 
of sharing are disproportionately professionals, sales workers, and skilled 
Fig. 5.2    The distribution of shared compensation and decision-  making systems
Source: Calculated from WRPS (Workers Representation and Participation Survey).
Notes: The predicted values treat the proportion of workers with each of the shared systems 
as independent events. Thus, if 1/  2 of the workers had an EI system and 1/  10th had some 
ownership, the predicted proportion with both systems would be 1/ 20th, the predicted propor-
tion with neither system would be 9/  20ths and the predicted proportion with only one of the 
two would be 1/  2. The actual proportions are taken directly from the data.Table 5.3  Proportion of persons with speciﬁ  ed characteristics, total sample and by 
extent of shared capitalism
    Full sample   Nothing  
Everything 
(P, O, EI)
A Demographic, occupational, and industrial characteristics
College Education 0.26 0.21 0.35
High wage 0.24 0.19 0.38
Male 0.54 0.50 0.64
Salaried 0.31 0.22 0.46
Age 37.81 36.27 38.39
Occupations:
  Professional 0.24 0.20 0.27
  Clerical 0.19 0.20 0.14
  Sales 0.10 0.07 0.16
  Manuf.  representative 0.03 0.01 0.04
  Service  worker 0.10 0.14 0.04
  Skilled  tradesman 0.15 0.15 0.17
  Semi-  skilled  worker 0.10 0.11 0.10
  Laborer 0.09 0.11 0.08
  Other 0.01 0.01 0.01
Industries:
  Agriculture/forestry/ﬁ  shing 0.02 0.02 0.02
  Mining 0.01 0.01 0
  Construction 0.05 0.06 0.04
  Manufacturing 0.27 0.23 0.39
  Transport/public  utilities/communications 0.09 0.06 0.08
  Wholesale  trade 0.05 0.04 0.05
  Retail  trade 0.16 0.18 0.12
  FIRE 0.08 0.06 0.16
  Health  services 0.11 0.13 0.06
  Business  services/law 0.07 0.07 0.05
    Educational, social services/membership orgs. 0.05 0.09 0.01
  Hotels 0.01 0.02 0.01
  Amusement/recreation  services 0.00 0.01 0.00
  Personal  services 0.01 0.01 0.00
  Misc. 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Other 0.01 0.01 0.01
  No  answer 0.02 0.02 0.01
B Firm characteristics
Firm size:
   25 0.00 0.00 0.00
  25–99 0.21 0.27 0.09
  100–499 0.25 0.27 0.21
  500–999 0.11 0.10 0.09
   1,000 0.44 0.36 0.60
Personnel dept 0.71 0.61 0.87
Open door policy (individual) 0.87 0.81 0.92
Grievance procedure 0.36 0.34 0.44
Town meeting 0.49 0.34 0.76
Open door policy (groups) 0.66 0.56 0.83
Employee committee   0.40   0.28   0.61
Sources: Panel A, WRPS, What Workers Want. For full distribution, see appendix tables 5A.1 
and 5A.2; panel B, WRPS, What Workers Want. For full distribution, see table 3.9.178    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
trades persons, and are disproportionately employed in manufacturing and 
ﬁ  nance, insurance, and real estate, and are twice as likely to be in ﬁ  rms with 
over 1,000 employees than those without any of these programs. The bottom 
part of table 5.3 shows that ﬁ  rms that share ﬁ  nancial rewards with employees 
and who have EI committees also have other “good” labor practices: person-
nel policies, open door policies, town meetings, and employee committees 
beyond EI committees.
5.4    Relation  to  Outcomes
To see whether shared compensation practices and employee involvement 
activities aﬀect worker attitudes and behavior, we examine seven measures of 
attitudes and behavior from the main body of the WRPS and two measures 
from the second wave of the survey5 that ﬁ  t broadly into four areas: produc-
tivity, satisfaction with workplace relations, attitudes toward the company, 
and worker retention.
The measures relating to productivity are the most problematic because 
the WRPS contains worker reports on productivity-  enhancing activity but 
not on actual productivity. The survey asked workers how often they made 
productivity-  related suggestions and how often management heeded them, 
coded on a four-  point scale from least (1) to most (4). We took the product 
of these two responses as the ﬁ  rst measure of productivity- enhancing activ-
ity, which gives a variable that ranges from 1 to 16. The survey also asked 
workers how much inﬂ  uence they exercise over workplace practices. This 
is our second measure of productivity-  related activity. Our third measure, 
from the second wave of the survey, asked workers to rate fellow employees 
on their concern for the success of the company and willingness to take on 
new responsibilities and to work hard using a school grade scale from A to 
E, which we coded as a rating from 1 to 5. These three measures are broadly 
informative about the extent to which workers engage in productivity-
  enhancing activities at their workplace.
To determine how workers feel about their job, we selected four variables: 
whether workers looked forward to going to work in the morning versus 
wishing they did not have to go; how they rated labor- management relations 
at their ﬁ  rm; their satisfaction with the inﬂ  uence they had at their workplace; 
and how they graded management’s treatment of employees using the school 
grade scheme. We chose these variables to investigate whether shared com-
pensation and decision- making create a work atmosphere where workers feel 
that their voice is heard and where management treats them fairly.
To measure the general attitude that workers have toward their ﬁ  rm, we 
took a question on the loyalty workers felt toward the ﬁ  rm and another on 
5. One-  third of the WRPS respondents were asked a short follow-  up set of questions, con-
stituting a smaller second wave sample. See Freeman and Rogers (1999).Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 7 9
the degree of trust they had that the ﬁ  rm would carry out its promises to 
workers. For worker retention, we use a question that asks how likely an 
employee will remain at the same company.
Finally, as a broad summary statistic of worker attitudes and possible 
behavior, we constructed an average outcome measure that includes the pro-
ductivity indicators, workplace satisfaction, and attitude toward the ﬁ  rm, 
and likelihood of staying with the company, with the variables given equal 
weight.6
What does the data show about the relation between shared compensation 
and shared decision-  making practices and these outcomes?
Row 1 of table 5.4 reports the coeﬃcients from a regression of our overall 
outcome measure on the forms of compensation and employee involvement, 
and on an extensive set of covariates that include the characteristics of work-
ers (age, gender, etc.) and of their ﬁ  rm (size, industry) as described in the 
table footnote. In addition, the covariates include measures of labor rela-
tions policies toward workers as groups and as individuals beyond shared 
capitalism and employee involvement. These measures are based on the 
presence of particular policies at the ﬁ  rm and on workers’ assessment of 
their eﬀectiveness, as reported on the WRPS.7 We give the highest score when 
ﬁ  rms have many practices that workers view as eﬀective and lower scores 
when ﬁ  rms have few practices or when workers view their practices as less 
eﬀective. With these measures of human resource practices in the equation, 
our estimates attribute to the shared compensation and decision-  making 
variables only the portion of the outcomes above and beyond those associ-
ated with these other attributes of ﬁ  rms.
Line 1 of the table shows that performance pay (PP), employee involve-
ment (EI), and ownership stake (OS) variables have statistically signiﬁ  cant 
eﬀects on the average outcome. The table also shows that while shared 
decision- making structures have an independent eﬀect on outcomes, the im-
pact of compensation practices appears to be contingent on such decision-
  making structures. The ﬁ  rm has to empower workers to make decisions if 
it expects to gain from shared compensation and ownership structures, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that such shared compensation schemes actually 
have incentive eﬀects.
We tested for complementarities by including interaction terms in the 
regressions—that is, a term for the presence both of an ownership stake 
and employee involvement committee, a term for ownership and proﬁ  t/  gain 
sharing, and so forth. Statistical tests reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no added eﬀect on outcome from complementarity between PP and EI at the 
6 percent level and reject the null of no interaction eﬀects between PP and 
6. Since all other variables here are in a 1 to 4 scale, we multiply the likelihood by 4 in terms 
of the overall outcome measure to ensure all variables get roughly an equal weight.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.182    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
OS and EI and OS at weaker levels (15 to 21 percent). Thus, the data support 
a complementary relation of the impact of the shared systems variables on 
the average outcome.
To examine the interactive eﬀects of variables on outcomes more directly 
we replaced the measures of each separate policy with mutually exclusive 
variables representing each possible combination of practices, and regressed 
outcome variables on this new set of independent variables. Rows 2 through 
13 of table 5.4 gives the regression coeﬃcients on dummy variables rep-
resenting all the combinations of EI, Ownership, and Performance Pay. 
Here, EI means “EI only,” “P” means “Performance Pay only,” “P,EI” means 
“Performance Pay and EI” and so on. Row 2 gives the coeﬃcients on these 
variables on our overall outcome measure. Succeeding lines give coeﬃcients 
on separate outcomes grouped into our three categories.
These calculations show that EI has a substantial and statistically signiﬁ  -
cant link to all outcomes, whereas the compensation variables by themselves 
have limited importance. But the threefold combination of EI, ownership, 
and performance pay is always statistically signiﬁ  cant and represents the 
numerically largest value in the overall outcome regression and in all of the 
regressions for separate outcomes save one. To give a sense of the magnitudes 
of the eﬀect, we note that the standard deviation in the average outcome (row 
1) is around 0.64 (see appendix B). The presence of EI by itself is associ-
ated with a 0.43 standard deviation gain, while the presence of EI, O, and 
P are associated with a gain of 0.66 standard deviation—as compared to 
companies without any of the shared compensation and decision-  making 
schemes. The average productivity variable shows a gain of 0.59 standard 
deviations for EI only and a gain of 0.76 standard deviations for the EI/ P/ O 
combination.
Looking at the underlying variables, the table shows that EI is critical 
for practices to aﬀect productivity-  related measures. Complementary com-
pensation variables boost the productivity indicators (productivity related 
suggestions, peer rating of eﬀort, and the extent of inﬂ  uence in produc-
tivity decisions) only when coupled with EI decision-  making structure. In 
contrast, attitudes toward companies are aﬀected by shared compensation 
structures that include both ownership and performance pay separately from 
EI. Finally, for the measures of worker satisfaction EI always matters while 
compensation structures matter independently for some but not all variables. 
In all cases, the combination of EI, ownership, and performance pay is sig-
niﬁ  cant and quantitatively greater than individual eﬀects and often greater 
than the sum thereof.
The human resource policy variables enter signiﬁ  cantly in our regressions, 
so that our results on shared compensation and decision-  making systems 
are an “add on” eﬀect. The regressions in table 5.5 show that the eﬃcacy of 
the human resource policies themselves is related to the shared compensa-
tion and decision-  making systems. The WRPS asked workers about the 
eﬀectiveness of our group-  based HR policies: town meetings, open door Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 8 3
policies, employee committees independent of EI, and about HR policies 
toward individuals as a group. We regressed workers’ assessment of the 
eﬀectiveness of these programs on our shared compensation and decision-
  making variables and a full set of demographic and company controls. The 
regressions show that the eﬃcacy of the human resource policies is higher 
in the presence of shared compensation and decision-  making systems with 
a pattern quite similar to that found in table 5.4. Since our measure of 
HR policies in those regressions included a weighting of the variables by 
their eﬀectiveness, at least part of the eﬀect credited to HR policies might 
be due to compensation and decision-  making structures increasing their 
eﬀectiveness.
5.5    Probing  the  Results
Even in the presence of the proxies for human resource and personnel 
policies, the regression results could reﬂ  ect an unobservable latent variable 
that is correlated with the EI and compensation policies, which would bias 
upwards the estimated impact of shared compensation and decision- making 
on outcomes. “Good” ﬁ  rms, in particular, are likely to have both worker-
  friendly practices and policies and have workers who are reasonably satis-
ﬁ  ed with conditions, and may be more likely to attract and retain more 
productive workers as well.8 Absent good exclusion restrictions (variables 
Table 5.5  Impact on eﬀectiveness of other human resource practices
    EI   P   O   P,O   P,EI   O,EI   P,O,EI
Eﬀectiveness of group-  based 
  HR  policies
  “Town  meetings” 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.22∗∗ 0.22 0.36∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13)∗∗∗ (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
    Open door policies for  0.14∗ 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.19∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
  groups (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08)
  Employee  committees 0.32∗∗∗ 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.27∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Eﬀectiveness of individual-    0.32∗∗∗ 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.27∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
     based HR policies   (0.11)   (0.11)   (0.13)   (0.12)   (0.12)   (0.13)   (0.12)
Source: WRPS wave 1.
Notes: Controls include age, education, sex, race, experience, union membership, tenure, ﬁ  rm size, plant 
size, occupation (nine categories), industry (ﬁ  fteen categories), and salaried/nonsalaried status. Robust 
standard errors are within parentheses. All regressions use WRPS sample weights.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.
8. The term “good” is only being used as a shortcut for a ﬁ  rm having a set of practices that 
tend to produce a higher level of outcome in terms of worker satisfaction and participation.184    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
that impact the incidence of the policies without directly impacting out-
come) we probe this possibility by exploiting the multiple outcomes that 
the WRPS obtained for each person. We focus on the productivity variables 
on the grounds that they are the most problematic measures and thus more 
likely to fail to stand up to probing than some of the others. We use a two-
 equation model to estimate the eﬀect of the policy variables on productivity 
net of the composite worker satisfaction variable. To the extent we expect the 
general or attitudinal outcomes (such as company loyalty, job satisfaction, 
and worker-  management relations) to reﬂ  ect an omitted “company eﬀect,” 
using those variables as controls better isolates the impact of EI and com-
pensation structures on the productivity outcomes.
However, simply including the attitudinal outcomes as independent vari-
ables in regressions does not recover a lower bound on the eﬀect of shared 
compensation and decision making on productivity because the measures 
of attitudes will be correlated with the error term in the regression for pro-
ductivity. To see this, let Y1i measure productivity, and Y2i be worker satis-
faction; ai is the latent company eﬀect; Xi is the vector of controls. Consider 
two equations:
(1)  Y1i  b1(Xi)  g1Di  (c1ai  e1i),
(2)  Y2i  b2(Xi)  g2Di  (c2ai  e2i).
Our model allows F(ai, Xi), F(ai, Di), F(e1i, e2i) to be arbitrary. We assume 
that there is a single unobservable factor ai correlated with the treatment 
status, Di, while the error e is uncorrelated with treatment status. Moreover, 
the joint distribution of the error e and the covariates Xi is independent of 
the treatment status.
Substituting the second equation into the ﬁ  rst gives the following:






c2g2Di  e1  
c1 
c2e2.
But if we regress Y1 on X, Y2, and D, we would not recover the desired 
lower bound g1 –   (c1/  c2)g2 because our regressor Y2 is correlated with the 
error term e1 –   (c1/  c2)e2.
Netting the productivity measures of the overall job satisfaction involves 
a two-  step procedure. The ﬁ  rst step uses moment restrictions implicit in the 
single factor model to identify the relative importance of the latent factor 
on the various outcomes. The second step uses this to “net out” the latent 
factor. The formal derivation of this is in Dube (2003). Here we describe the 
method. First we note that if we knew c1/  c2, the following regression would 
recover the lower bound on b1, g1 –   (c1/  c2)g2:
(4)  Y1i  
c1 
c2Y2i  b1  
c1 
c2b2Xi  g1  
c1 
c2g2Di  e1  
c1 
c2e2.Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 8 5
However, since we do not know (c1/  c2), we must estimate it in another 
step. Under the assumptions about the covariance structure invoked before, 








V(Y1i X,D =1)−V(Y1i X,D = 0)









We estimate the previous equation to recover (c1/  c2) in step one, which is 
then used to estimate the primary regression to recover a lower bound on b1; 
that is, (b1 –  (c1/  c2)b2). Because (c1/  c2) is estimated, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) standard errors in the primary regression are not valid. Therefore, we 
use bootstrapped standard errors for this estimation.
Table 5.6 gives the coeﬃcients from this exercise using the average of 
our productivity variables as the dependent variable and the average of our 
satisfaction variables as the control for the ﬁ  rm being “good.” The results 
show that even attributing all of the link between job satisfaction and shared 
compensation variables to a latent variable does not eliminate the eﬀect 
of EI and the EI, P, O combination of policies on productivity outcomes. 
Moreover, the eﬀects of the EI, P, O combination continue to be larger than 
Table 5.6  Regression estimates of the impacts of shared compensation and EI on productivity 
after controlling for their impacts on average satisfaction; and regression estimates 
of impacts using propensity score matching





1. Average productivity 0.41∗∗∗ 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.4∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ N
(0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
2. Average productivity


















Propensity score matching estimates
3. Average productivity 0.38∗∗∗ 0.01 0.62∗∗∗ N
(0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
4. Average productivity









   satisfaction”)                                
Source: WRPS wave 1.
Note: Controls include age, education, sex, race, experience, union membership, tenure, ﬁ  rm size, plant size, occupation 
(nine categories), industry (ﬁ  fteen categories), and salaried/nonsalaried status. Bootstrapped standard errors are within 
parentheses. “Average productivity” is a composite variable based on “productive suggestions” and “overall inﬂ  uence 
at job”; “Average satisfaction” is a composite variable based on “Overall satisfaction with workplace inﬂ  uence,” “Over-
all job satisfaction,” and “Management employee relations.” (see table 5.5).
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.186    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
those of EI in isolation, supporting the assertion that the compensation 
variables matter in conjunction with EI. While this single omitted factor 
model cannot provide the conﬁ  dence of an experiment, it is the toughest 
hurdle that we could set up using unobservables and the main results pass 
it. At the minimum, it shows that the policies impact productivity beyond 
their impact on worker satisfaction.
5.6    Propensity  Score  Test
We also probe our results using propensity scores that relate having the 
relevant policies to covariates and then comparing outcome variables within 
groups with similar propensity scores. Estimation involves collapsing the 
covariates into a single function—the propensity score, which is the proba-
bility of treatment given the covariates. As demonstrated in Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983), the outcome conditional on the propensity score is stochasti-
cally independent of the covariates.9 If within the groups that have similar 
probabilities of EI and shared compensation chance determines which work-
ers have EI and shared compensation and which do not, the propensity score 
technique identiﬁ  es the eﬀect of the policies on the outcomes.
Propensity score analysis can illuminate the patterns in the data in another 
way. Propensity score techniques enable us to see whether there is enough 
overlap in observations with respect to propensity scores (and hence the 
covariates) to make this analysis credible. Since the estimator is a weighted 
average of within-  propensity-  score diﬀerences in mean outcomes, it com-
pares “similar companies” in coming up with the treatment eﬀect estimate. 
Say that the covariates Xi that predict whether or not a worker has EI or 
receives shared compensation pay are completely nonoverlapping between 
workers with those policies and those without the policies. Then identiﬁ  ca-
tion of the treatment eﬀect relies on extrapolation of the data to cover the 
range of the covariates, and should be viewed with suspicion.
We use a probit to estimate the propensity score for each of the following 
“treatment” variables—EI only, P, O only, and EI, P, O. For each of these 
cases, propensity score strata are created, and we check to see if the covari-
ates are balanced (which they are). We then use propensity-  score matching 
to pick with replacement the closest untreated company for each treated 
one. Table 5.6 reports the propensity score estimates of three of the policy 
categories—EI only and EI, P, O. We ﬁ  nd that the propensity score-  based 
coeﬃcients are quite similar to the coeﬃcients using OLS, and are statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level for EI and EI, P, O combinations. The 
9. Formally, let D measure the presence of the policies of interest, X be the covariates, and Y 
be the outcome variable and p(X) be the probability that an observation has the policies, then 
Σp(X) (E(Y1i | p(X), D  1) –   E(Y1i | p(X), D  0))w(p(X))  Σp(X) (b1(Xi,Di1) –   b1(Xi,Di0)  g1)
w(p(X))  g1  EX(b1(Xi,Di1) –   b1(Xi,Di0)).Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 8 7
results continue to hold when we look at diﬀerences between similar groups 
of companies—all of which increases our conﬁ  dence that shared compensa-
tion and decision- making policies have real impacts on worker contributions 
to company performance.
5.7    Establishment  Data
As noted, the measures of productivity in the WRPS are based on worker 
responses about activity rather than on measured productivity for their estab-
lishment or workplace. To obtain an alternative view of the link between 
shared compensation and decision-  making on outcomes at the establish-
ment level, we examine data from the 2003 California Establishment Sur-
vey (CES). This survey provides information on 1,080 establishments in 
2003.10 It asked about the use of shared stock ownership (ESOP and stock 
options) and proﬁ  t sharing and about organizational (including the use of 
“employee involvement”) programs such as quality circles and quality man-
agement programs. The CES asks about stock options besides ESOPs but 
not whether the companies are employee-  owned; and about proﬁ  t sharing 
but not about gain sharing or bonuses. With respect to output measures, the 
CES includes managements’ assessments on the extent of employee decision 
making, product/ service quality, and ﬁ  nancial performance, given on a 1 to 4 
scale and employee retention, deﬁ  ned as 1 minus the annual turnover rate.
Table 5.7 shows the distribution of proﬁ  t- sharing and stock ownership in 
the CES, with the summary statistics weighted by ﬁ  rm size to give estimates 
of the proportion of overall workforce in these programs. The incidence 
of EI is somewhat larger in the CES than in the WRPS, while the shared 
compensation ﬁ  gures are somewhat lower—though they are similar to other 
establishment-  level sources. But the incidence of EI by proﬁ  t sharing and 
ownership (not shown in the table) has a pattern comparable to that in the 
WRPS. Appendix table 5A.2 gives the means and standard deviations of the 
outcome measures for the CES.
The CES allows us to test whether the shared compensation and deci-
sion making are associated with better establishment outcomes. To assess 
the impact of compensation and decision making on establishment-  level 
outcomes, we regressed the management- reported measures of outcome on 
the same set of disaggregated combinations of EI, ESOP, or stock option 
10. This is a data set of private sector businesses designed by the UC Berkeley Institute of 
Industrial Relations, and conducted by the UC Berkeley Survey Research Center between May 
and October of 2003. The sample included private and nonproﬁ  t establishments with ﬁ  ve or 
more employees in California and excluded government agencies, public schools or universi-
ties, and agriculture, forestry, and ﬁ  shing. The unit of observation was an establishment (i.e., a 
single physical location at which employees work and business is conducted). A total of 2,806 
establishments were sampled, with 2,200 meeting the eligibility criteria. The response rate was 
49.1 percent, giving the sample of 1,080 establishments.188    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
ownership, and proﬁ  t-  sharing variables used in the table 5.4 analysis of 
the WRPS. The regressions include controls on ﬁ  rm size, age of establish-
ment, two- digit level industry dummies, four- part occupational distribution 
(share of workforce that is managerial, clerical, sales, or blue-  collar), share 
of workforce with college degrees, and share with collective bargaining con-
tracts. We also estimate the impact of the shared compensation and decision-
 making variables on a summary outcome, which is simply the average of the 
four variables.
Table 5.8 reports the results. Row 1 shows a pattern of regression coef-
ﬁ  cients for the impact of the shared compensation and decision-  making 
variable on the average of all outcomes in the CES data that resembles 
closely that found for their impacts on the average of all outcomes in the 
WRPS data. By itself, EI has a positive statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀect; but the 
combination of EI, P, and O has an impact two times that of EI by itself. 
This corresponds to a 0.58 standard deviation gain—similar to the ﬁ  ndings 
in WRPS. Row 2 shows that a formal EI program is associated with mana-
gers reporting greater employee decision making, but the combination of 
performance pay, ownership, and formal EI program registers the highest 
mark on worker decision making, though its diﬀerence from EI by itself 
is numerically small. Row 3 of the table shows that the combination of EI 
and some type of shared compensation leads to the largest and statistically 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀects on quality and ﬁ  nancial performance. Finally, the fourth 
row shows that EI increases employee retention; and that the combination 
of ownership, performance pay, and EI is associated with greater retention 
than other conﬁ  gurations.
In sum, the results from the establishment survey support the ﬁ  nding 
from the WRPS that shared compensation and decision-  making systems 
are complementary ways to increase participation and productivity at the 
workplace.
Table 5.7  Extent of participation in employee involvement and shared compensation 
in establishment-  level data
Proportion of Workers Participation in
    EI   Stock ownership   Proﬁ  t sharing   Stock options
None 64.15% 89.26% 78.32% 88.97%
  Under  25% 6.79% 5.11% 4.68% 4.39%
  25%  to  49% 6.47% 1.36% 2.68% 1.29%
  50%  to  74% 2.20% 1.18% 1.71% 0.64%
  75%  to  99% 1.65% 0.92% 1.23% 0.46%
  All 18.74% 2.17% 11.39% 4.25%
Some   35.85%   10.74%   21.68%   11.03%
Source: California Establishment Survey, 2003.Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 8 9
5.8    Conclusion
This chapter has shown that shared compensation is positively associ-
ated with shared decision making, and that combining shared compensa-
tion systems and employee involvement has greater impacts on outcomes 
than the systems separately. It has found comparable results in two very 
diﬀerent data sets: the worker-  based nationally representative WRPS and 
the establishment-  based CES focusing on one state, California. In both 
cases shared decision making and compensation are more likely to be found 
together than if ﬁ  rms chose them independently and have larger impacts 
on outcomes than they have separately. Although our results are based on 
correlations rather than experimental variation, they are robust to some 
statistical tests for unobserved “ﬁ  rm eﬀects.” Since it is hard to square the 
eﬀects of shared compensation systems with theories of individual behavior 
in which free- riding is important, our ﬁ  ndings point to possible importance 
of corporate culture and related behavioral economic factors in determining 
employee activity.
Table 5.8  Regression coeﬃcients and standard errors for the eﬀects of EI, performance pay, 
and ownership combinations in establishment-  level data
    EI   P   O   P, O   P, EI   O, EI   P, O, EI
1. Average Outcome 0.12∗∗ 0.01 0.09 –0.09 0.14∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
2. Extent of participation  0.28∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.13 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
  in  decision  making (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
3. Quality performance 0.12 0.03 0.08 –0.03 0.22∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.27∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
4. Financial performance 0.13 –0.04 0.15 –0.31 0.21 0.33∗∗ 0.32∗
(0.11) (0.25) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17)
5. Employee retention 0.06 0.05 0.10∗ 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.14∗∗
    (0.04)   (0.07)   (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.06)
Source: California Establishment Survey, 2003.
Notes: Controls include ﬁ  rm-  size (5 categories), 2-  digit industries, percent of workforce with college 
degrees, percent of workforce managerial/clerical/sales/blue-  collar, percent of workforce unionized, and 
age of establishment. Robust standard errors are within parentheses. Average outcome.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.190    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
Appendix A
Table 5A.1  Calculating the percentage of employees/ﬁ  rms with pay related to 
company/group performance
Stock ownership programs (about 25% of nonagricultural workforce)
  1.   Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPS) and Stock Bonus 
Plans (1998)(8.5 million workers)
8% of nonag empl
  2.   All Employee Stock Option Plans (1999)    (7.0–10.0 million 
workers)
8% of nonag empl
  3.   Receive stock options or opportunity to buy company stock (1999) 26% of workforce
  4. Workers eligible for options from 1,352 large ﬁ  rms, 1999 19% of covered
  5. Firms oﬀering stock-  based compensation, ACA Compensation Survey 1999–2000
Nonexempt Exempt
Hourly nonunion  Salaried Salaried  oﬃcers/execs
Stock Option 22 26 66 94
Co Stock Purchase 57 56 63 64
Stock  Grant  6  6 22 48
Phantom  Stock  1  1  5 16
Co Stock via 401(k) 68 72 73 72
  6.   Fortune 1000 companies oﬀering options to 60% or more workers 13%
Proﬁ  t/gain sharing (around 25% of US workforce)
  7.   Workers in medium and large establishments with deferred proﬁ  t 
sharing, 1997
19% of workforce
 8.  Proﬁ  t/gain sharing in Fortune 1000 (1996) 45% of ﬁ  rms
  9. Firms with some proﬁ  t sharing, 1993–1998 33%–40% of ﬁ  rms
10.   Receive bonus based on own performance or company 
performance
43% of workforce
Deﬁ  ned contribution pension funds invested in company stock (11% of workforce)
11. Employees with 401(k) plans 55% of full-  time workers in 
priv. nonfarm estab.
12. Estimated proportion of 401(k) assets in company stock
      a) EBRI estimate, 1998 17.7%
      b) Hewitt estimate, 1999 23.3%
13.   Savings and thrift plans, % of workers in plans that allow for 
investment in company stock
    Firm  contribution 42%
    Worker  contribution 46%
Overall variable pay practices, FRB survey
14. Percentage of 125 Major Corporations (1999)
All workers Managers   Professionals
Any type 88% 85% 69%
Stock options 34% 33% 7%
Proﬁ  t sharing 50% 48% 44%
  Performance bonus   75%   69%   41%  
Sources: Line 1: National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee Ownership Report, Jan/Feb 2000, 
p. 9.
Line 2: National Center for Employee Ownership, private communication.
Line 3: Newsweek Poll, June 24–25, 1999, www.pollingreport.come/workplay.htm.
Line 4: Watson Wyatt (2000) Survey of Top Management Compensation, www.watsonwyatt.com/
homepage/us/new/pres_rel/Jan00/execpay_2.htm.Complementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 9 1
Line 5: ACA (2000) Compensation Survey, of 2,683 US companies; 208 Canadian companies. See www
.acaonline.org/resources/generic/html/aca-  salarysurvey-  99-  2000.html. Number of responding ﬁ  rms 
ranged from 516 to 896.
Line 6: Association for Quality and Participation Survey, cited by NCEO.org/library/optionfact.html, 
“The rise of broadly granted employee stock options.”
Line 7: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Beneﬁ  ts in Medium and Large Establishments, 1997, 
table 1; sum of percent reported deferred proﬁ  t sharing in various forms.
Line 8: Economic Policy Foundation “US Wage and Productivity Growth” Washington, April 16, 
1998.
Line 9: US Chamber of Commerce (1988); Doug Kruse, 1993, pp. 8–10.
Line 10: Newsweek Poll, June 24–25, 1999, www.pollingreport.come/workplay.htm.
Line 11: US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 1999, table 622.
Line 12: Economic Beneﬁ  t Research Institute, EBRI Issue Brief Number 218, February 2000. Hewitt 
Resources: The Hewitt 401k Index observations, p. 2, www.hewitt.com/resc/resc055.htm.
Line 13: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Beneﬁ  ts in Medium and Large Establishments, 1997, 
table 155.
Line 14: Survey by FRB, Lebow et al. (1999), table 1.
Table 5A.1  (continued)
Appendix B
Table 5A.2  Means and standard deviations of outcome measures in WRPS and CES
    Mean   Standard deviation
WRPS outcomes
Average outcome 2.84 0.64
Productivity AVERAGE 2.65 0.74
  Productive  suggestions 2.45 0.96
  Overall  inﬂ  uence in job 2.87 0.85
  E ﬀort of fellow employees 2.34 0.60
Satisfaction AVERAGE 2.74 0.63
    Overall satisfaction with workplace inﬂ  uence 2.92 0.85
  Overall  job  satisfaction 2.42 0.86
  Management-  employee  relations 2.87 0.94
    Composite “grade” for management 1.88 0.79
    Reported loyalty toward company 3.34 0.82
    Reported trust toward company 3.10 0.90
    Likely to keep working in company 0.58 0.49
Eﬀectiveness of
  Town  meetings 3.01 0.77
    Open door policies for groups 3.18 0.72
  Employee  committees 3.15 0.68
  Individual-  based  HR  policies 3.00 0.82
CES outcomes
Average outcome 1.85 0.40
    Extent of participation in decision making 0.53 0.40
  Quality  performance 3.36 0.65
  Financial  performance 2.79 0.89
  Employee  retention   0.71   0.67192    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
Appendix C
Table C1: Relevant WRPS questions for table 5.2
For compensation practices, the following question was asked:
D16. On your (main) job, do you . . . (READ ITEMS, IN ORDER) 
(answer yes/know/don’t know)
d16a. Receive any bonuses based on proﬁ  t sharing?
d16b. Receive any bonuses based on meeting workplace goals?
d16c. Participate in an employee stock ownership or ESOP plan?
d16d. Work in an employee-  owned (company/organization)?
For Employee Involvement, the following two questions were asked. Only 
those answering yes to q24 were coded as being in EI programs.
q23. Some companies are organizing workplace decision-  making in new 
ways to get employees more involved—using things like self-  directed work 
teams, total quality management, quality circles, or other employee involve-
ment programs. Is anything like this now being done in your (company/
organization)?
1 Yes (GO TO Q24)
2 No
9 Don’t know/refused
q24 (ASK ONLY IF RESPONSE TO Q23  1) Are you personally in-
volved in any of these programs at work?
1 Yes
2 No (GO TO Q27)
9 Don’t know/refused (GO TO Q27)
Table C2: Relevant WRPS questions for tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6
Questions asked to respondents, and deﬁ  nitions of various indices:
All the four-  point outcome variables were reordered (so that more is bet-
ter) for the regressions. Below we report the actual questions used in the 
Survey, as well as diﬀerent weighting schemes when appropriate. Unless 
otherwise reported, all “don’t know” responses are coded as missing data.
Outcome variables:
1)  “Loyalty to Company”:
q9c. And, how much loyalty would you say you feel toward the (com-
pany/organization) you work for as a whole—a lot, some, only a little, or 
no loyalty at all?
1 A lot of loyalty
2 Some loyaltyComplementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 9 3
3 Only a little loyalty
4 No loyalty at all
2)  “Trust towards Company”:
q10a. (ASK OF FORM A ONLY) In general, how much do you trust your 
(company/organization) to keep its promises to you and other employees? 
Would you say you trust your (company/organization)? (READ)
1 A lot
2 Somewhat
3 Only a little
4 Not at all
9 Don’t know/refused (DO NOT READ)
3)  “Index Rating of Management”: This was constructed by taking the 
summated ratings (where A  5, . . . , F  0) on the following three ques-
tions, and then scaling by 4/15 to make the ﬁ  nal outcome on a 1–4 scale:
16A. If you were to rate the performance of management in your com-
pany on a scale similar to school grades (A for excellent, B for good, C for 
Fair, D for Poor, and F for failure) what grade would you give MANAGE-
MENT in the following areas? (ROTATE ITEMS)
•    Concern for employees
•    Giving fair pay increases and beneﬁ  ts
•    Willingness to share power and authority
4)  “Management Employee Relations”
q11. Do you think relations between employees and management at your 
(company/organization) are BETTER than average, WORSE than average, 
or about the SAME as in other places?
1 Better
2 Worse
3 About the same
9 Don’t know/Refused
5) “Job Satisfaction”: (This was coded as follows, “1” was coded as 4, 
“8” as 2.5, and “2” as 1.)
q8. On an average day, what best describes your feeling about going to 
work? Would you say you usually . . . (READ AND ROTATE CATEGO-
RIES 1 AND 2)
1 Look forward to it
2 Wish you didn’t have to go
8 Don’t care one way or the other/mixed feelings (VOLUNTEERED)
9 Don’t know/refused
6)  “Overall Reported Satisfaction with Inﬂ  uence”
q14_1,2,3,4. Now I want to ask about your involvement in decisions on 
the job. Overall, how satisﬁ  ed are you with the inﬂ  uence you have in com-194    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
pany decisions that aﬀect your job or work life? Would you say you are . . . 
(READ)
1 Very satisﬁ  ed
2 Somewhat satisﬁ  ed
3 Not too satisﬁ  ed
4 Not satisﬁ  ed at all
9 Don’t know/refused (READ)
7) “Eﬀort of Fellow Employees” (Wave 2): This was constructed by tak-
ing the summated ratings (where A  5, . . . , F  0) on the following ques-
tions and then scaling by 4/15 to make the ﬁ  nal outcome on a 1–4 scale:
16B. If you were to rate the performance of employees in your company 
on a scale similar to school grades (A for excellent, B for good, C for Fair, 
D for Poor, and F for failure) what grade would you give EMPLOYEES in 
the following areas? (ROTATE ITEMS)
∗Willingness to work hard; ∗Concern for the success of the company; 
∗Willingness to take on new responsibilities
8) “Overall  Inﬂ  uence at Job:” This is a summated rating of 3 questions. 
But there are two versions asked depending of the 1st of second random 
half of form A.
q12a. (ASK OF FORM A ONLY) (Now I want to ask about your involve-
ment in diﬀerent decisions on the job.) How much direct involvement and 
inﬂ  uence do YOU have in (ITEM)? (A lot, Some, Only a little, No) direct 
involvement and inﬂ  uence at all? (ASK ITEMS a–d ONLY OF THE FIRST 
HALF OF THE FORM AND ITEMS e–h ONLY OF THE SECOND 
HALF OF THE FORM). (Responses: 1 A lot of direct involvement and 
inﬂ  uence, 2 Some direct involvement and inﬂ  uence, 3 Only a little direct 
involvement and inﬂ  uence, 4 No direct involvement and inﬂ  uence, 5 Does 
not apply [VOLUNTEERED], 9 Don’t know/refused)
q12aa. Deciding HOW to do your job and organize the work
q12ab. Deciding what TRAINING is needed for people in your work 
group or department
q12ad. Deciding how much of a RAISE in pay the people in your work 
group should get
q12ae. Setting GOALS for your work group or department
9)  “Suggestions”: This is a weighted summated rating index. The primary 
question is:
q17. (IF S6  4) How often, if ever, do YOU make suggestions to your 
supervisor or to management about how to improve quality or productivity? 
Would you say you make such suggestions . . . (READ)
1 Often
2 SometimesComplementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 9 5
3 Hardly ever
4 Never
9 Don’t know/refused (DO NOT READ)
This was weighted by the perception of how often these suggestions are 
listened to. The question is:
q18. (IF S6  4) When you, or other employees like you, make suggestions 
about improving quality or productivity, how often does management take 




4 Never . . . takes them seriously?
9 Don’t know/refused (DO NOT READ)
10)  “Worker Retention” is a variable that takes on 0 or 1 depending on 
whether the respondent says s/he is likely to remain with the company (i.e., 
responses 1 and 2) to the following question:
q7. Which ONE of the following four statements best describes how you 
think of your CURRENT job? Is it . . . 
1 A LONG-  TERM job you will stay in?
2 An opportunity for ADVANCEMENT in this SAME (company/
organization)?
3 Part of a CAREER or profession that will probably take you to DIF-
FERENT companies?
4 A job you will probably LEAVE that is NOT part of a career?
5 Other
9 Don’t know/refused
11)  “Overall Outcome” is an averaged rating of all the previous variables 
(scaled to a 1–4 scale) with the following caveats. (9) and (7) were asked of 
diﬀerent people so we combined them to make a single question about inﬂ  u-
ence. Also, (3) and (8) were asked of a subsample, so these were not included. 
(However, we did construct the same variable including [3] and [8] for the 
subsample: results were similar).
12) The  eﬀectiveness of various HR programs came from the following 
questions:
Individual:
q29. On a diﬀerent subject, I want to ask how problems involving INDI-
VIDUAL EMPLOYEES are solved at your workplace. Which of the follow-
ing, if any, does your (company/organization) have? (READ AND ROTATE) 
(Responses: 1 Yes, 2 No, 9 Don’t know/refused)
q29a. A PERSONNEL or human resources department
q29b. An OPEN DOOR policy so employees can tell upper management 
about problems with their immediate supervisors196    Arindrajit Dube and Richard B. Freeman
q29c. A GRIEVANCE procedure that uses an outside referee or arbitra-
tor to settle disputes
q32. OVERALL, how eﬀective is your (company’s/organization’s) sys-
tem for resolving the problems INDIVIDUAL employees have at work? 
Would you say it is . . . (READ)
1 Very eﬀective
2 Somewhat eﬀective
3 Not too eﬀective
4 Not eﬀective at all
9 Don’t know/refused (DO NOT READ)
The HR_Individual control variable for the outcomes regression was con-
structed by summing over q29a through q29c, and multiplying the sum by 
q32.
Group:
q36. Now let’s talk about company policies regarding wages, beneﬁ  ts, 
and other things aﬀecting employees as a GROUP. Which of the following, 
if any, does your (company/organization) have to deal with issues that aﬀect 
employees as a group? (First,) (is/are) there . . . (READ)(Responses: 1 Yes, 
2 No, 9 Don’t Know/Refused to Answer)
q36a. Regular “town” meetings with employees, called by management
q36b. An open door policy for GROUPS of employees to raise issues 
about policies with upper management
q36c. A committee of employees that discusses problems with manage-
ment on a regular basis
q37. (ASK FOR EACH ITEM WHERE Q36  1) How eﬀective (has/
have) (ITEM) been in resolving group problems or concerns—very eﬀective, 
somewhat eﬀective, not too eﬀective, not eﬀective at all? (Responses: 1 Very 
eﬀective, 2 Somewhat eﬀective, 3 Not too eﬀective, 4 Not eﬀective at all, 
9 Don’t know/Refused to answer)
q37a. The “town” meetings
q37b. The open door policy
q37c. The employee committee
The HR_Grp control variable for the outcomes regression was created by 
summing up the (weighted) incidences of the various group-  based HR 
policies; that is, q37a∗q36a  . . .  q37c∗q36c.
Table C3: Questions from CES (for table 5.8)
QL5a: What percentage of NON-  MANAGERIAL AND NON-
 SUPERVISORY workers are involved in regularly scheduled meetings to 
discuss work-  related problems:
•    None of them
•   Less  thanComplementarity of Shared Compensation and Decision-  Making Systems    1 9 7
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